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CASES NOTED
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL-
ONE WAY OR THE OTHER
The petitioner, Dickey, a federal prisoner in Leavenworth, Kansas,
had been the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant from Gadsden
County, Florida since 1960.' In 1962, 1963, and 1965, he filed petitions
in the Gadsden Circuit Court asking the state attorney to either return
him to Florida to stand trial for the crime charged by the warrant or to
withdraw the detainer 2 against him on the ground that he was being
denied a speedy trial. After each of these petitions were denied by the
circuit court,8 Dickey petitioned the Florida Supreme Court to issue a
writ of mandamus ordering the circuit court to either secure his return
for trial or withdraw the detainer.
In Dickey v. Circuit Court,4 the Florida Supreme Court held that
incarceration in another jurisdiction does not make the accused un-
available for trial since there have long been means by which one juris-
diction, for the purpose of a criminal trial, can obtain custody of a
1. Robert Dean Dickey was in custody in the Jackson County Jail, Marianna, Florida,
on federal bank robbery charges when he was identified by a female robbery victim as the
man who had robbed the Clark's Motor Court in Gadsden County at 12:00 midnight on
June 28, 1960. Pursuant to the identification an arrest warrant was issued charging Dickey
with armed robbery. (Under Florida law this step tolls the statute of limitations. See
Rosengarten v. State, 171 So.2d 591 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965); State v. Emanuel, 153 So.2d 839
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).) From July 1960 to September 1960, Dickey remained in the Jackson
County Jail, but the Gadsden County Sheriff's office, fully cognizant of his whereabouts,
made no effort to serve the warrant or gain custody for trial. In September of 1960, Dickey
was convicted on federal charges and was removed from Florida, first to Leavenworth and
then to Alcatraz, whereupon a formal detainer was lodged against him.
2. A detainer, or hold order, notifies the incarcerating authorities that the prisoner is
wanted, and requests that the authorities desiring custody be forewarned of the prisoner's
release date so they can arrange to pick him up at the institution. The existence of a de-
tainer may have several adverse effects upon the prisoner. He may, for that reason, be held
under maximum security. He may also be denied opportunities open to other prisoners,
such as transfer to a minimum security area, the privilege of being a trustee, or assignment
to a job involving a degree of trust. The detainer makes the prisoner's future uncertain,
and, thus, renders more difficult the formulation of an effective rehabilitation program.
Many parole boards will not consider parole for a prisoner who has a detainer lodged
against him. See L. HALL, Y. KASIMAR, W. LAFAYE, & J. ISREAL; MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 921 (3d ed. 1969) (chapter 19 provides a good discussion of the recent develop-
ments in the law of speedy trial).
3. The petitions were denied on several grounds: first, that Dickey's unavailability for
trial in Florida was the result of his voluntary commission of a federal crime, the natural
consequence of which was incarceration in a federal penal institution; second, that the
speedy-trial issue was prematurely raised because only at the time of trial can a determina-
tion be made as to whether the delay has made a fair trial impossible; third, that even if
the denial of an immediate trial was violative of Dickey's sixth amendment rights, it was
a deprivation caused wholly by the federal officials having custody of his person, and relief
must be sought from those authorities.
4. 200 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1967).
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prisoner held by another.' Pursuant to the 1967 decision,' the Gadsden
County State's Attorney issued an information and secured petitioner's
return to Florida for the purpose of trying him for the 1960 robbery
charge. Dickey then moved to quash the information alleging that he had
been prejudiced by the long delay and that if he were tried, it would
be a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.' The
motion was denied, and the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to
ten years imprisonment. The petitioner then appealed from the trial
court's denial of the motion to quash whereupon the District Court for
the First District of Florida affirmed the conviction." On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, held, reversed: An accused who makes
diligent and repeated efforts by motions in a state court to secure a
prompt trial, who is tried and convicted eight years after the alleged
commission of a crime, and who is prejudiced by the unnecessary delay,
has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Dickey v.
Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970). 9
The right to a speedy trial is conferred by both the federal" and
state1' constitutions and expressed by both state statute 2 and federal
rules." Until recently, however, the right has been conservatively inter-
preted by the courts. 4 Prior federal decisions had held that the sixth
5. This decision by the Florida Supreme Court came two years before a similar decision
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
6. In substance, the court held for Dickey, but since he had named the circuit court
as respondent, rather than the appropriate state attorney, his petition was dismissed without
prejudice to his right to file another petition naming the appropriate respondent. Dickey
v. Circuit Court, 200 So.2d 521, 528 (Fla. 1967).
7. The motion to quash alleged that the delay of more than seven years was sufficiently
prejudicial to make a fair trial impossible because an essential and material witness, Dickey's
sister, had died in 1964, and that had she been available she would have testified that
Dickey called her from Georgia on the night the alleged robbery was committed.
8. Dickey v. State, 215 So.2d 772 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
9. In 1967, the Supreme Court in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) held
that the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial was binding upon the states through
the fourteenth amendment. See notes 21 and 22 infra and accompanying text.
10. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
trial ... ." U.S. CONST. amend VI.
11. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand, . . . have a speedy
and public trial by impartial jury . . . where the crime was committed ... " FLA. CONST.
DECL. OF RICHTS § 16.
12. FLA. STAT. § 918.015 (Supp. 1970) provides: "Right to speedy trial.-In all criminal
prosecutions the state and the defendant shall each have the right to a speedy trial." [Sub-
sequent to the writing of this article, FLA. STAT. § 915.01 (Supp. 1970) and FLA. STAT.
§ 915.02 (Supp. 1970), which dealt with the "three term of court" speedy trial rule, have
been repealed. In lieu thereof the Florida Supreme Court has passed an amendment to the
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure through which the right to a speedy trial as guaranteed
by the Constitution shall be realized. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.191 (1971).]
13. If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charges to a grand jury or
in filing an information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the
district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the
court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint.
FED. R. CRIMT. P. 48(b).
14. See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966), wherein the Court held a 19-
month delay between arrest and hearing on the indictments was not a violation of the sixth
amendment, because
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amendment federal guarantee of a speedy trial was not directly applicable
to state action,15 but that an unreasonable delay of a state trial could, if
sufficiently prejudicial, violate a defendant's due process rights under
the fourteenth amendment due process clause.' In determining whether
the denial of a speedy trial has assumed proportions which contravene the
notion of due process the courts generally considered four factors:
the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the prejudice to the defen-
dant, and waiver by the defendant.17 Thus, if there were a seemingly good
reason for the state's delay,'8 if the defendant could show no prejudice,"
or if the defendant had somehow waived his right to a speedy trial (e.g.,
by pleading guilty, by agreeing to a continuance, or by not making a
timely demand for a trial),2 there was no denial of due process of law.
Then, in 1967, the Supreme Court held in Klopfer v. North Caro-
lina,2 that the sixth amendment standards governing the right to a speedy
trial are binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment:
In the light of Gideon, Malloy, and other cases cited in those
opinions holding various provisions of the Bill of Rights appli-
cable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
statements made in [West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904)]
and similar cases generally declaring that the Sixth Amendment
does not apply to the States can no longer be regarded as the
law. We hold that petitioner was entitled to be tried in accord-
ance with the protection of the confrontation guarantee of the
Sixth Amendment, and that that guarantee, like the right
against compelled self-incrimination, is "to be enforced against
The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and
depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude
the rights of public justice.
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966), quoting from, Beavers v. Haubert, 198
U.S. 77, 87 (1905).
In United States ex rel. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1963), a three year,
seven month delay from indictment to trial was held not to be a denial of the right to a
speedy trial since the state, claiming its principal witness was in India, had good reason
for the delay. See generally Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REV.
1587 (1965). Cf. United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1955), where a
twenty-year delay in bringing the defendant to trial was considered to be a denial of the
right to a speedy trial.
15. Beasley v. Pitchess, 358 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Von Cseh
v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1963); Odell v. Burke, 281 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 875 (1960); Germany v. Hudspeth, 209 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1954).
16. Beasley v. Pitchess, 358 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1966).
17. Id. at 708; Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 CoLum. L. REv. 846
(1957).
18. See United States ex rel. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1963) where the
state's excuse for a three year and seven month delay was that its principal witness was in
India and unavailable.
19. Id. The defendant was out on bail during the three year and seven month delay
so the court reasoned he was not prejudiced by the delay.
20. See cases collected in Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302 (1958) (Waiver or loss of accused's
Right to a Speedy Trial). See also United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1958).
21. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
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the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the
same standards that protect those personal rights against federal
encroachment." [Citation omitted.] We hold here that the right
to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured
by the Sixth Amendment. That right has its roots at the very
foundation of our English law heritage.22
This extension of the right to a speedy trial led to the new question
of whether a state has, upon demand, an affirmative duty to secure the
presence of the accused for trial when the accused is incarcerated by
another sovereign.28 This question was answered in the affirmative first
by the Florida Supreme Court in Dickey v. Circuit Court,24 and later by
the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Hooey.25
It is sufficient to say then when an accused held by another
sovereign makes demand for speedy trial in this state on charges
forming the basis for a detainer warrant pending against him
the state must initiate action to procure the presence of the
accused for trial, unless the circumstances make it unreasonable
for the state to do so.26
However, in neither case did the holding go so far as to say that the
refusal of a state to secure for trial an accused who was incarcerated by
another sovereign was a per se denial of the sixth amendment right to
a speedy trial. Indeed, in Smith v. Hooey, which was "remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion," Justice Harlan
stated in a separate opinion:
I do not believe that Texas should automatically forfeit the
right to try petitioner. If the State still desires to bring him to
trial, it should do so forthwith. At trial, if petitioner makes a
prima facie showing that he has in fact been prejudiced by the
State's delay, I would then shift to the State the burden of
proving the contrary.27
It is somewhat ironic that Justice Harlan, in his separate opinion in
Smith v. Hooey, raised the very questions which were before the Court
in the instant case:
I believe however, that the State is entitled to more explicit-
ness from us as to what is to be expected of it on remand....
22. Id. at 222, 223.
23. The converse of this question, i.e., that an incarcerated defendant could not object
to being remanded to another state for the purpose of trial, was established in Ponzi v.
Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922).
24. 200 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1967).
25. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
26. Dickey v. Circuit Court, 200 So.2d 521, 523 (Fla. 1967).
27. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 384 (1969).
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If petitioner contends that he has been prejudiced by the nine-
year delay, how is this claim to be adjudicated?28
This was the state of the law when Dickey argued that the failure of
Florida to secure his presence for trial pursuant to his 1962, 1963, and
1965 demands, and the resulting eight-year delay, was a denial of his
right to a speedy trial.
The argument of the Florida Attorney General in the instant case
was that when the petitioner demanded a trial in 1962, 1963, and 1965,
there was no constitutional requirement that Florida provide him with
a speedy trial in that Klopfer and Smith v. Hooey were not then the
operative law.29 Thus, the Court was presented with a perfect oppor-
tunity to hold Klopfer retroactive. Instead, Chief Justice Burger, speak-
ing for the majority, and without expressly stating the specific constitu-
tional basis for the decision, held for petitioner by stating:
[N]o valid reason for the delay existed; it was exclusively for
the convenience of the State. On this record the delay with its
consequent prejudice is intolerable as a matter of fact and im-
permissible as a matter of law. In addition to exerting every
effort to require the State to try him, there is abundant evidence
of actual prejudice to petitioner in the death of two potential
witnesses, unavailability of another, and the loss of police
records. This is sufficient to make a remand on that issue
[prejudice] unnecessary. We therefore reverse and remand ...
with directions to vacate the judgment appealed from and dis-
charge the petitioner .... o
Justice Harlan, apparently uncertain of the constitutional basis for
the majority's opinion, but strongly in favor of applying the due process
clause of the fourteenth as opposed to making the sixth amendment bind-
ing on the states through the fourteenth, 81 reasoned that by either stan-
dard the petitioner was denied a speedy trial.
However, whether it be the Due Process Clause or the Sixth
Amendment that is deemed to apply, I fully agree that peti-
tioner's federal constitutional rights were violated by Florida's
actions in this instance.8
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, hinted that the con-
stitutional basis for the decision is the due process clause.
Accordingly, assuming arguendo that Klopfer is not retro-
active, the question here is whether petitioner's trial was un-
28 Id. (emphasis added).
29. Brief for Respondent at 14, Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
30. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 36 (1970).
31. See the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213, 226 (1967) and his separate opinion in Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969).
32. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 39 (1970).
[Vol. XXV
CASES NOTED
constitutionally delayed under the test of due process appli-
cable to the states prior to KlopJer.3
After a lengthy and comprehensive discussion of the history of the law
relating to speedy trial, Justice Brennan concluded that the full scope of
the newly expanded right is yet uncertain and undefined.
These comments provide no definitive answers. I make them
only to indicate that many-if not most-of the basic questions
about the scope and context of the speedy trial guarantee re-
main to be resolved. 4
It may be that the impact of the instant case will be measured more
by what was not said than by what was. The specific constitutional basis
for the decision is somewhat ambiguous, and clarification by the Su-
preme Court is needed. The retroactivity of KlopJer remains an issue,
but on the rationale of the instant case, state court defendants who assert
a denial of a speedy trial prior to the 1967 Klopfer decision should be
prepared to establish the unconstitutionality of the delay under the old
test which necessitates a showing that the delay contravened the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment irrespective of the specific
guarantee of speedy trial under the sixth amendment. Establishing this
will, of course, depend upon the facts of each particular case. Appar-
ently, prejudice from the delay must still be established, and this is true
irrespective of the length of the delay. In this writer's opinion, a specific
showing of prejudice should be wholly unnecessary if the defendant can
show a substantial delay.8" The question of what is a substantial delay
should be determined by the Court as it further defines the scope of the
speedy trial right. The rule which appears preferable would hold any
trial more than six months after arrest to be stale. Establishing fixed
guidelines for determining what is, and what is not, a "speedy trial" is
essential if the right to a speedy trial is ever to enjoy the same enforce-
ability as the now firmly established right to counsel.
The instant case has established that the right to a speedy trial no
longer may be considered a mere theoretical or abstract right, but rather
a right rooted in the pragmatic need to have charges promptly disposed.
In spite of the Court's lengthy and comprehensive evaluation of the law
in this area, many questions pertaining to the scope and application
of the right to a speedy trial remain unanswered. However, it is almost
certain that the trends evidenced by the instant case and its predecessors
will result in increased awareness by the state of its duty to provide those
33. Id.
34. Id., at 56.
35. See generally United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1958). See also
Hedgepeth v. United States, 364 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Williams v. United States, 250
F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957). This would only be true, however, when the delay is not attri-
butable to the defendant's conscious effort to avoid trial.
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charged with crimes a speedy trial. In the words of Justice Brennan, "the
speedy trial guarantee should receive a more hospitable interpretation
than it has yet been accorded."36
ALBERT G. CARUANA
VOTING RIGHTS: LIMITATIONS ON THE FRANCHISE
BASED ON PROPERTY OWNERSHIP IN GENERAL
OBLIGATION BOND ELECTIONS
Pursuant to statutory provisions,' only real property taxpayers
were permitted to vote in an election to authorize the issuance of general
obligation and revenue bonds which were to be secured by property tax
revenues.' The appellee, a nonfreeholder, challenged the constitutionality
of this voting restriction and attacked the validity of the election. A three
judge federal district court declared the election unconstitutional, en-
joining the issuance of the approved bonds.' On appeal, the Supreme
Court of the United States held, affirmed: The challenged provisions of
the Arizona Constitution and statutes, when applied to exclude non-
property owners from voting for the approval of the issuance of general
obligation bonds, violate the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. 4 City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
The right to vote in state elections, though fundamental, is not
expressly guaranteed by the United States Constitution.5 However, the
states are limited somewhat as to their power to establish voter qualifi-
cations,6 and limitations on the right to vote based on property owner-
36. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 57 (1970) (concurring opinion).
Subsequent to the writing of this note, the trend has been in the direction of the
establishment of court made rules of procedure which generally prescribe that the defendant
must be tried within six months of arrest. See, e.g., Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt
Disposition of Criminal Cases, 434 F.2d Advance Sheet No. 2 p. LI (1971). See also FLA.
R. CIEn. P. 1.191 (1971), which provides, among other things, that a person charged with
a misdemeanor be tried within 90 days from the time such person is taken into custody;
that a person charged with a felony be tried within 180 days from the time such person
is taken into custody; and that any person charged with any crime, upon demand, be
brought to trial within 60 days of the filing of the demand.
1. ARIz. CONST. art. 7, § 13 and art. 9, § 8; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-523, 35-542
(1956); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-455 (Supp. 1969).
2. The general obligation bonds were to be issued to finance municipal improvements.
Under Arizona law, the city was legally privileged to use other revenues for this purpose.
3. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
4. The rule announced was to be applied prospectively only, but was applicable in
this case since the suit was brought within the prescriptive period (5 days) for challenging
the election pursuant to ARIz. REv. STAT. AN. § 16-1202 (Supp. 1969).
5. At the time the constitution was ratified, the majority of the states imposed
property qualifications to exercising the voting franchise. K. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUF-
FRAC,E IN THE UNITED STATES 110 (1918).
6. The states are prohibited from discriminating because of race, U.S. CONST. amend.
XV; sex, U.S. CONST. amend XIX; or ability to pay poll tax, U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
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